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STUDENT NOTES
The Privacy Interest of the Fourth Amendment-
Does Mapp v. Ohio Protect It or Pillage It?
"My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time-
To let the punishment fit the crime-
The punishment fit the crime,"
THE MIKADO by Gilbert & Sullivan
1. CHANGES IN CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
In order to maximize the protection guaranteed by the fourth
amendment, Mapp v. Ohio' must be overruled-but only under the
proper circumstances.
If the punishment for a particular crime is perceived as much
too severe or unjust, then the crime will be substantively changed by
the courts, i.e., less activity will be determined to fall within the
criminal proscription or only flagrant violations will be recognized
as the evil which the law was designed to prevent. The courts will
avoid imposing the sentence of the offense by refusing to recognize
that the action of the alleged offender was a crime. The truth of
this assertion may be accepted by common sense or history. For
example, in England during the 18th century there were more than
two hundred capital offenses, most of them crimes against property.
To avoid the imposition of the death penalty, courts and juries would
find no violation by so altering the substance of the crime that no
crime was recognized.2
The punishment for violating the fourth amendment is the
exclusion of seized evidence in a court of law. Often, the corollary
of this exclusion is freedom for a guilty criminal. Therefore, accepting
the above proposition, if it can be demonstrated that this punish-
ment-the exclusion of the evidence and resultant freedom for the
guilty defendant-is perceived as unfair by the courts, then the
fourth amendment rights will be substantively changed; i.e., the
privacy interest will be afforded less protection because less activity
will be determined to be a violation of the fourth amendment. The
'367 U.S. 643 (1961). The proper circumstances necessary to over-
rule Mapp will be discussed in part two of the Note.2 BLACKSTONE, B.ACKsToNjes COMMENrAIES ON THE LAw 754 (B. Gavit
ed. 1941).
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courts avoid excluding the evidence obtained by the search by re-
fusing to recognize that the police action violated the fourth amend-
ment. As less police activity is determined to be a violation, it must
necessarily follow that the scope of the fourth amendment is also
lessened. If the scope of the fourth amendment is narrowed, then
the privacy interest is likewise narrowed because protection of privacy
is the principal object of the fourth amendment.
A. Recognition of Substantive Changes by Writers and Courts
Although not specifically alluding to the privacy interest, some
legal scholars have recognized the lessening of constitutional standards
as a result of the exclusionary rule. Wigmore has suggested that
the rule may have the possible "collateral perverse effect" of causing
"the courts to reinterpret, to lower, constitutional standards in
order to avoid suppressing essential evidence."3 Though he admitted
it was difficult to demonstrate, he felt that a tendency to soften con-
stitutional standards could be inferred from decisions in several
states.4 Professor Barrett has asserted that "the exclusionary rule
creates pressure upon the courts to weaken the rules governing
probable cause to make an arrest ... where an obviously guilty de-
fendant is seeking to exclude from consideration at his trial clear
physical evidence of his guilt." He feels that determination of
probable cause to arrest cannot escape being colored by the fact that
evidence of guilt was found; yet the rules developed have equal
application to innocent persons.6 Professor Kitch sees the ex-
clusionary rule as placing the courts in the business of police ad-
ministration, and the "demands of administrative reasonableness
have begun to make significant inroads on formerly rigid con-
stitutional prohibitions."' He observes a tendency to modify the
constitutional privilege from unwarranted police intrusions according
to what can realistically be enforced by means of the exclusionary
rule.'
3 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2184, at 52 n.44 (McNaugton ed. 1961).
4 Id. "A tendency .. . can be inferred from the decisions in California,
Idaho, North Carolina, and Rhode Island [apparently broadening the concept
of 'reasonable search'] and in Florida [narrowing the group of persons with
standing to complain]."
5 Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 55.61d.
7 Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure, 1969 Su.
Cr. REv. 155, 158.8 Id. at 157-72.
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The courts have recognized the unfairness of a rule which may
result in freeing a guilty criminal. In United States v. Frank," a
federal district court in Pennsylvania stated that the fourth amendment
was designed to protect the citizen from government oppression but
not to afford a suspected criminal every possible opportunity to avoid
detection. The Arizona Supreme Court"0 felt the fourth amendment
should not assist a criminal in escaping penalty for his misdeeds, and
remedies should recognize this principle. Judge Friendly sensed the
inherent unfairness of the exclusionary rule which punishes an error
in judgment formed instantaneously without the aid of the United
States Reports."
B. Empirical Data
Empirical data also demonstrates that the presence of the ex-
clusionary rule has resulted in the dilution of substantive fourth
amendment rights. Certain court decisions which have refused to
find a fourth amendment violation have been clearly erroneous in
terms of the purely abstract question of reasonableness of the search.
Other decisions which have limited the scope of the rule have, in
effect, condoned a privacy invasion in those areas not responsive to
the rule. The courts have utilized reasonableness of a search, "stand-
ing" to object to a search, or exceptions to the warrant require-
ment to circumvent the exclusionary rule, but by so doing, have
simultaneously contracted the interests guaranteed by the fourth
amendment.
1. Reasonableness of a Search
Frequently, the courts, by upholding a warrantless search as
reasonable, sanction an invasion of fourth amendment interests. The
Fourth Circuit recognized that "some searches may be so eminently
reasonable as not to fall under the interdict of the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 2 In a California case,' 3 officers entered an apartment be-
cause they heard moans. Though no one was present, a search was
conducted and seized evidence was admitted at trial. The noises that
justified the search were actually pigeons cooing.
9 151 F. Supp. 864 (W.D.C. Pa. 1957).
'"State v. Berg, 259 P.2d 261, 76 Ariz. 96 (1953).
" Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53
CAL. L. REV. 929, 952 (1965).
'2 United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962). Defendant
loaned his car to a friend who consented to a search. Upon visible examination,
police found stolen radios. Held: search reasonable.
'3 People v. Roberts, 46 Cal. 2d. 379, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
[Vol. 74
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The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the action of police who,
without a warrant, entered an apartment on the authority of the
landlady to investigate a murder. 4 It felt a search and seizure with
the landlord's permission was reasonable under certain circumstances.
Yet the Supreme Court in Chapman v. United States'" had rejected
the contention that a landlord, since he might be permitted to enter
the premises, could therefore authorize the police to conduct a search.
The Court recognized such a search would leave the tenant's home
secure only in the discretion of his landlord. 6
2. "Standing" to Object to a Search
The "standing" limitation on the scope of the exclusionary
rule is another means used by the courts to dilute the privacy interest.
The exclusionary rule may be used only by a person who has "stand-
ing' to object to the unconstitutionality of a search. The primary
requirement for "standing" is that the person be the one aggrieved by
the search, i.e., the one against whom the search is directed."7 A
person cannot employ the exclusionary rule if the evidence was
obtained through an unlawful invasion of the rights of some other
person, even though the evidence is being used to convict him of a
crime.'" This limitation on the scope of the exclusionary rule is in-
consistent with the reasons for the rule and shows an unwillingness
by the Court to extend the rule to its logical conclusion when this
would encroach upon the public interest in having a verdict on the
true facts.'
3. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement"
Chief Justice Warren in Terry v. Ohio recognized the limits of
the usefulness of the exclusionary rule,2' holding a police "stop and
frisk" constitutional when based on reasonable suspicion. The Chief
Justice noted that:
,4 Eisentrager v. State, 378 P.2d 526, 79 Nev. Rptr. 38 (1963).
Is 365 U.S. 610 (1961).16 1d. at 617.
17 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
I8 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
19d. at 174-75.2 The exceptions include: search incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); consent by the proper party, Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); "stop and frisk," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)(officer may stop and "frisk," provided he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the individual is armed and dangerous); "hot pursuit," Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police may enter premises without a warrant when in
"hot pursuit' of a suspect); emergency to prevent a loss of evidence, Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of a vehicle).21 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
4
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It [the exclusionary rule] cannot properly be invoked
to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative
techniques on the grounds that much conduct which is close-
ly similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitu-
tional protections. . . .Doubtless some police "field in-
terrogation" conduct violates the Fourth Amendment. But
a stern refusal by this Court to condone such activity does
not necessarily render it responsive to the exclusionary
rule. . .. [A] rigid and unthinking application of the ex-
clusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which
it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a high
toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crime.
22
The Court in creating the Terry exception did not condone
unwarranted invasions of privacy but only recognized the ineffective-
ness of applying the exclusionary rule in this situation. However, by
stating that the Court's sole technique of protecting the privacy interest
is not "responsive," in essence the Court has condoned invasions of
privacy. It is hollow verbiage to say the right still exists, but if that
right is violated, the sole remedy will not apply. As the sole sanction
of the right, the exclusionary rule cannot be removed in selected
violations without removing the substance of the right.
In Cooper v. California,2 the defendant was arrested after selling
narcotics to an informer. His car, in which the transaction occurred,
was impounded pursuant to California law. After a lapse of a week,
a search was conducted which provided evidence subsequently used
in his conviction.
Prior to Cooper, a warrantless search had never fallen within
the "incidental to an arrest" exception to the warrant requirement
unless the search was proximate to the arrest. The state of California
conceded the search was not incidental to the arrest, but argued
the search was reasonable because of a statute 4 which required
officers to seize any vehicle connected with the violation of narcotics
law and hold it for evidence until either released or forfeited to the
state.
22 Id. at 13-15.
23386 U.S. 58 (1967).
1
4 CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETy CODE §§ 11610-11 (West 1964).
(Vol. 74
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The California district court relied on Preston v. United States"
to invalidate the search in Cooper.6 The search in Preston had been
invalidated because it was too remote from the time and place of
the arrest.2" The search in Cooper was even more remote than in
Preston. In upholding the search in Cooper and distinguishing
the two cases, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
lawful custody does not dispense with constitutional requirements,
but "the reason for and the nature of the custody may constitution-
ally justify the search. 29 The Court felt it would be "unreasonable"
to hold that police who had lawful custody for an extensive period
of time could not, at least for their own protection, search the car."0
What danger does an impounded car pose that would justify the
police disregarding the warrant requirement of the fourth amend-
ment? The impact of the decision seems to be the interpretation
given it by lower courts that the requirements for searches incident to
an arrest had been loosened.3
The right of a third party to consent to a search has been
recognized in circumstances involving various relationships between
the parties.32 In each of these instances, the courts have found the
search constitutional if the consenting party possessed control or
lawful possession of the articles or the premises on which they were
located. 3 The variances in court decisions rest in determination of
the third party's authority to consent.
The California Supreme Court felt that the owners of premises
could consent to a general search of the premises, but could not
25 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
26 People v. Cooper, 234 Cal. App. 2d 587, 44 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1967).
However, the conviction was affirmed because of the California harmless
error rule.
27 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964).28 The search in Preston was conducted on the same day the arrest was
made, but after petitioner had been taken into custody and the car towed to a
garage. The search in Cooper occurred a week after the arrest of the petitioner.
29386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967).
30 .d
31 See Davidson v. Boles, 266 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. W. Va. 1967); Draper
v. Maryland, 265 F. Supp. 718 (D. Md. 1967).
S2 See, e.g.: Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (joint users); United
States v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1970) (spouses); Wright v.
United States, 389 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1968) (roommates); United States v.
Stone, 401 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1968) (parents-children); United States v.
Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962) (bailor-bailee); United States v. Sferas,
210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954) (business
partners).
"United States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 845 (3d.
cir. 1970) (dissenting opinion).
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consent to the search of belongings which they knew were the
property of a third person.14 The court disallowed the third party
consent even though such third party was technically in lawful pos-
session of such belongings. In contrast, two different courts upheld
the third party consent of a drycleaning proprietor to a police search
of clothing in the proprietor's temporary possession." Though in
different settings, the cases are parallel: each consenting party owned
the premises; the consenting parties possessed temporary lawful pos-
session of the articles; each knew the article belonged to a third
person.
Numerous courts have upheld a search where the landlord
properly consented and another's property was in plain view.36 As
previously stated, Chapman rejected the landlord's authority to
consent to a search, restating that constitutional rights are not based
on the formal rules of property law."
II. ALTERNATrVES
This analysis at the very least raises substantial questions as to
whether the exclusionary rule is an effective sanction of fourth amend-
ment rights. The obvious conclusion is that the rule does not protect
the privacy interest but "steals" from it. Thus, to maximize the
privacy interest, Mapp v. Ohio must be overruled if a proper case
is before the Court which has suitable alternatives to replace the
exclusionary rule. The case attempting to overrule Mapp must pre-
sent an alternative which has proven successful in controlling local
police conduct.
To prevent invasions of privacy by the state, the exclusionary
rule must be changed because, as a punishment, the rule is viewed
as too severe. However, Mapp is seen as the only punishment. Thus,
if Mapp is overruled, there will be no punishment. This will be per-
ceived as erasing the crime. Police will be given a license to ignore
the fourth amendment because without a punishment, there can
be no crime. Therefore, the Court should overrule Mapp only if
34 People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964).
35 State v. Howe, 182 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1970); Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d
1322 (6th Cir. 1970).
36 See, e.g., Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965); Woodard
v. United States, 254 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
37 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). The Court cited
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), which rejected the subtle
distinctions of property law as the basis of determination of constitutional
rights.
[Vol. 74
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satisfactory alternatives have been established. The case which will
allow the Court to dispense with the exclusionary rule must contain
an alternative method which has been successful in enforcing con-
stitutional guarantees and controls over illegal searches and seizures.
Various methods have been suggested to control unlawful
police conduct. A common-law tort action has been considered
but felt not to be an effective control because of the unwillingness of
juries to find substantial damages against police officers.38 How-
ever, Professor Oaks feels an effective tort remedy is the solution.39
He feels such a remedy would provide the real consequence neces-
sary to give credibility to the guarantee whether the injured party was
prosecuted or not.
Another possibility may be an outside review board with dis-
ciplinary powers. The apparent drawback seems to be the lack of
enforcement power given civilian review boards now operating in
other areas.4" An untried alternative would have the courts citing
offending officers for contempt of court."1 Judge Friendly suggests
that the Court follow Scotland's policy 2 which is to deny police the
"fruits" only in flagrant violations. 3 Canada controls the action of
police by use of a police disciplinary board and prosecution for
misconduct by a tort action.4
Any of the above suggestions may be a plausible alternative,
but a combination of two would give the individual greater assurance
of being free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court,
when presented with the opportunity, should abolish the exclusion-
ary rule in favor of a tort remedy coupled with the exclusion of
evidence in flagrant violations. With a tort remedy available, a per-
son whose constitutional rights are invaded need not be prosecuted
to have redress available. A tort remedy would insure the innocent
38 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39
MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
9 Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 756 (1970).40 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINI-
STRATION OF JusTcF, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE PoLIcE 200-04 (1960).
41 Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police
Conduct, 78 YALE LJ. 143 (1968).
42 Lawries v. Muir, 1950 Just. Cas. 19. This country excludes flagrant or
deliberate violations.4 3 Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL.
L. REv. 929, 953 (1965).
44 For a thorough examination of the Canadian system see Oaks, supra
note 39, at 701-06.
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